The Regulators by O\u27Reilly Jr, John D
Boston College Law Review
Volume 11
Issue 4 The Federal Regulatory Agencies During The
Decade Of The 1960's A Symposium
Article 10
5-1-1970
The Regulators
John D. O'Reilly Jr
Follow this and additional works at: http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/bclr
Part of the Consumer Protection Law Commons
This Book Review is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Boston College Law Review by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ Boston College Law School. For more
information, please contact nick.szydlowski@bc.edu.
Recommended Citation
John D. O'Reilly Jr, The Regulators, 11 B.C.L. Rev. 863 (1970), http://lawdigitalcommons.bc.edu/
bclr/vol11/iss4/10
BOOK REVIEW
The Regulators. By Louis M. Kohlmeir, Jr, Harper & Row,
1969. Pp. xi, 339.
This book sets out to be the spearhead of a crusade for protection
of consumers' economic interests, a critique of inefficient government
administration, and a model for the structuring of government organ-
ization. Written by an experienced journalist with a felicitous literary
style, and relating various episodes in several federal agencies, it is
designed to convey the impression that the entities chosen by Congress
to carry the regulatory statutes into execution are so mutually confused
and internally incompetent that the purposes of the laws are frustrated.
The author's main targets are the "so-called" independent agen-
cies. They are said to work at cross purposes with the conventional
executive branch and with one another. They are biased toward the
interests of those whom they are supposed to regulate, and unduly
susceptible to selfish suggestions of influential members of Congress.
The remedy for this sad state of affairs is abolition of the agencies and
transfer of their policy-making functions to the President, and of their
adjudicatory functions to specialized courts in some instances, and to
the existing federal courts in other situations.
Basically, the author is presenting a thesis of a simplistic separa-
tion-of-powers organization of government proposed in one form or
another in the 1930s and the early 1940s. The Brownlow Committee
of 1937 advocated creation of twelve cabinet departments among which
all administrative functions would be distributed.' Each department
would contain a completely independent section to perform adjudica-
tive functions. In Great Britain, the Committee on Ministers' Powers
advocated that the rule-making functions be retained in the various
ministries, but that the adjudicative functions be transferred to the
ordinary courts.' A special committee of the American Bar Association
suggested that the adjudicative functions of all agencies be lodged in a
hybrid administrative court with panels of specialists in various areas.3
A modification of this approach to government structure had a brief
renaissance in 1959 when Mr. Louis J. Hector, upon his resignation
from the chairmanship of the Civil Aeronautics Board, submitted a
memorandum to President Eisenhower.' The author refers to this mem-
1 President's Comm. on Administrative Management, Report of the Committee With
Studies of Administrative Management in the Federal Government 1-58 (1937).
2 Committee on Ministers' Powers Report, Cmd. No. 4060 (1932).
3 For a discussion of this proposal and other related issues, see Cooper, The Pro-
posed United States Administrative Court, 35 Mich. L. Rev. 565 (1937) ; Landis, Crucial
Issues in Administrative 'Law—The Walter-Logan Bill, 53 Harv. L. Rev. 1077 (1940) ;
O'Reilly, The Federal Administrative Court Proposal: An Examination of General Prin-
ciples, 6 Fordham L. Rev. 365 (1937).
4 Hector, Problems of the CAB and the Independent Regulatory Commissions, 69
Yale L.J. 931 (1960).
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orandum, and apparently drew much of the inspiration for his thesis
from it.°
A constant theme running throughout the book is that the inde-
pendent agencies have, in one way or another, allowed themselves to
be diverted from their assigned task of protecting consumer interests.
Such criticism is based upon the undocumented assumption that con-
sumer welfare is the direct statutory responsibility of the agencies.
Such an indiscriminate generality could not be documented. While it
is undoubtedly true of all legislation that it is presumably designed
to promote the general welfare, it should be self-evident that, for ex-
ample, the Federal Trade Commission's concern with consumer in-
terests is much more direct and immediate when it is conducting pro-
ceedings under the Fur Products Labeling Act° than when it is acting
under the Federal Trade Commission Act. 7
Apart from the author's questionable assumptions, the material
he presents in support of his adverse criticism of the agencies is less
than convincing. For example, the adverse evaluation of the Federal
Communications Commission is based largely, though not entirely,
upon the scandalous episode involving Commissioner Richard A. Mack
and the award of the Miami Channel 10 television franchise, and upon
the fact, presented with innuendoes, that Austin, Texas is the largest
American city with but a single VHF television station, and this is
owned by Mrs. Lyndon B. Johnson.
Nor is the author's appraisal of specific events always knowl-
edgeable. In chiding the Federal Trade Commission for "preoccupation
with trivia," he cites the case of the zealous staff member who com-
menced a proceeding under the Fur Products Labeling Act against a
manufacturer of denim overalls which bore the label, "Red Fox." How-
ever, he lumps into the same category the proceeding against the par-
ties involved in the television commercial which supported a claim that
the advertised shaving cream would facilitate the shaving of sand off
sandpaper by picturing a razor scraping sand from a sheet of plexi-
glass.' The fact of the matter is that the latter case established the
important principle that the Commission has authority to issue orders
of very wide scope against a manufacturer and its advertising agency
forbidding false or misleading advertising of products.
Unquestionably, it is important that the interests of consumers
receive maximum legal protection. But failure to realize this ideal
results more from deficiencies in the substantive laws than from the
shortcomings of administrators of existing laws. Congress is aware of
this and has passed legislation to minimize some of the deficiencies. In
very recent years it has enacted such statutes as the National Traffic
5 He fails, however, to present the arguments against such an approach. See, e.g.,
Kintner, The Current Ordeal of the Administrative Process: In Reply to Mr. Hector, 69
Yale L.J. 965 (1960).
6 15 U.S.C. § 69 et seq. (1964).
7 15 U.S.C. §§ 41 et seq. (1964).
FTC v. Colgate-Palmolive Co., 380 U.S. 374 (1965).
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and Motor Vehicle Safety Act of 1966,° the Fair Packaging and Label-
ing Act," and the Truth in Lending Act.' Other comparable legislation
is under consideration. Admittedly there are shortcomings in the ad-
ministrative agencies. But in order to correct them one must first iden-
tify them in a more meaningful way than the shotgun method utilized
by Mr. Kohlmeir. Experience has shown that there are effective ways
of analyzing the problems and devising remedies.
Perhaps the first comprehensive study of the operation of gov-
ernment agencies was conducted by the Attorney General's Committee
on Administrative Procedure. This body, composed of representative
members of the bench, the bar, the law schools and government service,
surveyed in depth the structure and the work of the federal adminis-
trative bodies. Its 1941 report, supported by staff monographs con-
taining detailed examination of the work of individual agencies, led,
after a war-caused delay, to the Administrative Procedure Act of
1946.12
More recently, a comprehensive re-examination of government
administration, focusing upon the work of the principal independent
agencies, was conducted at the instance of the late Speaker Sam Ray-
burn by a special House Committee on Legislative Oversight. For con-
tinuing surveillance of agency operations, there has been established
the Administrative Conference of the United States," not yet ad-
equately funded, but with at least a chairman and the nucleus of a
permanent staff. Also, a subcommittee of the Senate Judiciary Com-
mittee, the Subcommittee on Separation of Powers, conducts in-depth
studies of the current work of selected agencies. It is to this process
of laborious collection of detailed facts and expert opinions, rather
than to a process of relating interesting anecdotes, that we must look
for ongoing improvement in the administration of the laws.
JOHN D. O'REILLY, JR.
Professor of Law
Boston College Law School
° 15 U.S.C. § 1381 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1969).
10 15 U.S.C. § 1451 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1969).
H. 15 U.S.C. § 1601 et seq. (Supp. IV, 1969).
12 5 U.S.C. § 1001 et seq. (1964).
13 5 U.S.C. § 1045 et seq. (1964).
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